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THE GENERAL ARTICLES, ARTICLES 133 AND 134
OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
LT. COL. GCILBIRT G. ACKROYD t
INTRODUCTION
W E begin this discussion by taking certain liberties with
' the Uniform Code of Military Justice, for that Code
mentions only one "General Article," Article 134, and we are
going to use that description in referring to Article 133,
"Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman," as well.
However, considering the history and indeed the very nature of
these two articles, the reader will readily understand that the
term "general" is here being used merely in a sense opposite
to the term "specific," that is, in regard to the rather generic
ideas of criminality or misconduct, which in some instances
consist only of a failure to comply with certain necessary mil-
itary standards, expressed in both of these articles. It also
will be found that some of the particular acts or omissions
which run afoul of these two articles do not always have con-
venient criminal connotations of the type immediately recogniz-
able by one trained in the common law, but perhaps somewhat
unfamiliar with military life, customs, and historical devel-
opment. Such crimes as murder, robbery and larceny are
traditionally recognized as abhorrent and as calling for pun-
ishment at the hands of the state by all of us, military and
civilian; and even the act of being drunk in or out of uniform
in a public or private place, being an offense under Article
134 if sufficiently discreditable,1 would hardly give pause to
t Chief, Military Justice Division, Office of The judge Advocate General,
United States Army. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of The Office of The judge
Advocate General or any other governmental agency.
'United States v. Lowe, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 654, 16 C.M.R. 228 (1954);
United States v. McMurtry, A.C.M. S-1547, 1 C.M.RL 715 (1951).
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the average police court judge. However, the Article 134
offenses of dishonorable failure to pay debts, incapacitating
oneself for the proper performance of duties through previous
indulgence in intoxicating liquors, and discharging a firearm
through carelessness, and many other instances of question-
able conduct which for one reason or another fall within the
proscriptions of the general articles,2 may not be too well
understood by every student or practitioner of the law as
amounting to conduct for which a criminal penalty may or
should be imposed.
The true general article, Article 134, makes punishable
by its terms three different types of offenses, whether com-
mitted by an officer or an enlisted person. These are dis-
orders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and dis-
cipline in the armed forces, conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not
capital.' Of course, it may well be that one act will suffice
to fall under the ban of all three of these proscriptions.
Article 133 makes punishable conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman indulged in by an officer, cadet, or mid-
shipman,' and it need hardly be said that anyone occupying
one of these positions of honor who is guilty of unbecoming
conduct is very apt to find that he has also violated at least
one of the tenets of Article 134.1 In order better to under-
2 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951 (app. 6c, Specs.
Nos. 114-176) [hereinafter cited as MCM, 19511.3 Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter cited as UCMJ] art. 134,
10 U.S.C. §934 (1958) states: "Though not specifically mentioned in this
chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline
in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject
to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general,
special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of
the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court."
4UCMJ art. 133, 10 U.S.C. §933 (1958) states: "Any commissioned
officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
SUnited States v. Middleton, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 54, 30 C.M.R. 54 (1960);
United States v. Gunnels, A.C.M. 11938, 21 C.M.R. 925, 956 (1956) (and
cases cited therein), rev'd on other grounds, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R.
354 (1957); United States v. Loney, C.M. 355287, 8 C.M.R. 533 (1952),
petition for review denied, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 678, 8 C.M.R. 178 (1953).
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stand the meaning and reasons for these articles, a necessarily
brief excursion into their history might prove helpful.
HIsToRY
The very early English military codes 6 contained no
general articles and dealt principally with the prohibition of
specific types of misconduct which might adversely affect the
internal discipline of the army in its encampments or while on
the march. Of particular concern were the property rights
of officers and soldiers among themselves. A prisoner, or
the ransom that one might obtain from a prisoner, was
obviously a most valuable spoil of war in those days, for the
Articles of Richard II contain a number of provisions which
carefully detail a captor's rights in this respect.7
As a result of the labors of King Gustavus Adolphus
(Gustavus II) of Sweden and his ministers, we see a re-
markably detailed and developed military code in existence
early in the seventeenth century." After dealing with almost
every conceivable aspect of military life, in and out of camp,
in the first 115 articles of his code signed in the year 1621, his
Article 116 reads as follows:
Whatsoever is not contained in these Articles, and is repugnant
to Military Discipline, or whereby the miserable and innocent
country may against all right and reason be burdened withall, what-
soever offense finally shall be committed against these orders, that
shall the severall Commanders make good, or see severally punished
unlesse themselves will stand bound to give further satisfaction for
it.
6 See WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 903 (app. I) (1920
War Dep't reprint of 2d ed. 1896) [hereinafter cited as WINTHROP], quoting
Ordinance of Rich. I, 1190; WINTHROP 904 (app. II), quoting Arts. of War
of Rich. II, 1385.
T Arts. XII, XIX, XXII.
8 See WINTHROP 907 (app. III), quoting Code of Articles of King Gustavus
Adolphus of Sweden, 1621. There were, of course, earlier Continental
European military codes. WINTHROP 17-18. Gustavus Adolphus, no doubt
with the help of his chief ministers, was a genius for detail in all matters
military. The author has seen some of his Tables of Organization and Tables
of Equipment in the military museum in Stockholm. In many respects, these
tables are remarkably similar in format to the tables in use in modern armies.
There are many other items of interest concerning Gustavus Adolphus and
his times in the National Museum in Stockholm.
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The above general article is very probably the ancestor of our
present Article 134, for the military code of the great Swedish
king was translated into English and published in London in
1639 9 and seems to have had a considerable influence on
later English military codes. Although Gustavus Adolphus
does not mention "crimes or offenses not capital" in his gen-
eral article, probably because he had no need to express a
noneapital limitation under the legal system of his time and
place, he has included both of the other aspects of our present
general Article 134, with interesting limitations, however, on
the modern theory of the offense of casting discredit on the
military service. It will be noticed in this latter connection
that the "miserable and innocent country" must be "burdened
against all right and reason." Anyone who has ever studied
conditions as they existed during Gustavus' time will have
no trouble in agreeing with him that the war-ravaged lands
affected by his military operations and those of others were
truly in a miserable condition, but the phrase "burdened
against all right and reason" perhaps requires some explan-
ation. This explanation is found in other articles of the code
which attempt carefully to limit and control what appears
to be a vested right in the soldiery to pillage under certain
conditions and to impose heavy burdens on the citizenry.' 0
One might ask why it was that Gustavus felt the need
for his particular general article. The answer to this question
is supplied inferentially by the Code itself. It has already
been indicated that the general article was preceded by 115
articles, mostly punitive in nature, and a further reading
9 See WINTHROP 19, 907 n.1 (app. III); DAVIS, MILITARY LAW OF TE
UNIm STATES 340 (3d ed. 1915). It seems that Gustavus' general article
was also the ancestor of one of our claims statutes. UCMJ art. 139,
10 U.S.C. §939 (1958). The Articles of the Earl of Arundel, published in
1639 during the reign of Charles I, are printed in 1 CLoDu, MILITARY FORCES
OF THE CRowN 429-40 (1869). The general article in that code reads: "In
whatever cases or accidents that may occurre, for which there is no speciall
order set downe in the lawes here published, there the ancient course of
marshall discipline shall be observed untill such time as his Excellence
the Lord General shall cause some further orders to be made and published in
the Armie, which shall thenceforward stand in force upon the paines therein
expressed."20 See, e.g., Articles 93-96 of the Articles of Gustavus Adolphus.
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will show that eleven more specific offenses are listed follow-
ing the general article, apparently as an afterthought. Even
among persons with such vivid imaginations as Gustavus and
his ministers, it was realized that it would be asking too much
of human intelligence to attempt to forecast and catalogue
every possible event which might unduly burden the civilian
populace or which might be disruptive of military discipline,
and perhaps gravely so. War was an immensely complicated
affair even in those days, indeed one may say particularly
in those days with their gross lack of communications. The
maintenance of effective disciplinary control in this rough
era-the one factor that distinguished an army in any real
sense of the word from a mere mob of bandits, plunderers,
and potential deserters-was a difficult and exacting task
beyond all modern military experience. Consequently, some
means had to be found to correct possible omissions and over-
sights in the structure of the military law, and that means,
then as now, was the general article.
After passing over some earlier British military codes, we
next come to the British Articles of War of James II, pro-
mulgated in 1688. These contain sixty-four articles, and in
them one can clearly see some of the progenitors of certain
articles of the Uniform Code. Of chief interest here is the last
of these articles, the general article, which states:
All other faults, misdemeanors, and Disorders not mentioned in
these Articles, shall be punished according to the Laws and Customs
of War, and discretion of the Court-Martial; Provided that no
Punishment amounting to the loss of Life or Limb, be inflicted upon
any Offender in time of Peace, although the same be allotted for
the said Offense by these Articles, and the Laws and Customs of
War. 11
11 See WINTHROP 928 (app. V), quoting Articles of War of James II,
art. LXIV. Winthrop sets forth a still earlier English general article,
that found in the Articles of the Earl of Essex of 1642. It is substantially
the same as the James II version except that the word "offenses" is used
-where the word "misdemeanors" is found in the later code, and the limitation
upon punishment amounting to the loss of life or limb is omitted. The
Articles of the Earl of Essex are printed in PIPoN, MILrrARY LAW, app. 11
(3d ed. 1863), with the exception of a few missing articles which are printed
in 1 CLoDE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 443. The general article was dubbed
[ VOL. 35
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The British Articles of War of 1765,12 which were in
force at the beginning of our Revolutionary War, contained
a somewhat different version of the general article. Section
XX, Article III, of that military code provided:
All Crimes not Capital, and all Disorders or Neglects, which
Officers and Soldiers may be guilty of, to the Prejudice of good
Order and Military Discipline, though not mentioned in the above
Articles of War, are to be taken Cognizance of by a Court-martial,
and be punished at their Discretion.
It will be noticed immediately that the mere limitation upon
punishment amounting to the loss of life or limb found in the
general article of James II appears in the 1765 general article
as a jurisdictional limitation, not only in time of peace, upon
the prosecution by courts-martial of "crimes not capital"
under that article. This is not difficult to understand, for
less than a year after the articles of James II were pro-
mulgated, the English Revolution took place, James II lost
his throne to William and Mary, and the first British Mutiny
Act was passed by Parliament. This act, although the prin-
cipal event which brought it about was the defection to James
of a detachment of mostly Scottish troops, had the effect of
prohibiting the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction in places
where the British civil courts were in operation except with
respect to offenses (mutiny, sedition, and desertion in this
particular act) specifically made the subject of such juris-
"the Devil's Article' by the British soldier because of its catch-all nature.
See WINTHROP 720 nn.64 & 67. For general remarks concerning British
military codes antedating that of James II, see WINTHROP 18-19. See also
1 WINTHROP, MIITARY LAW 8 n.1 (1st ed. 1886) for a possible explanation
of the frequent use of the year 1686 instead of 1688 in referring to this code
of James II.
1 2 WINTHROP 931 (app. VII). A 1774 edition of this code changed the
general article by substituting for the word "Court-Martial" the words "Gen-
eral or Regimental Court Martial, according to the Nature and Degree of the
Offence." See DAvIs, op. cit. supra note 9, at 341 and app. B. This change also
appears in the American military codes of 1775, 1776, and 1806. See note 14
infra. The British military code of 1692 for use "in the Low Countries
and Ports beyond the Seas" is printed in WALTON, I-STORY OF THE
BanisH STANDING ARmy 1660-1700, app. LIII (1894). The general article in
this code is the same as that in the 1688 code of James II except that the
word "crimes" is added to the list of prohibitions and the limitation
upon punishment amounting to the loss of life or limb is omitted. The cited
appendix to Walton's work also contains materials concerning earlier codes.
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diction by Parliament itself. In this manner, Parliament
reaffirmed and strengthened a position long held by that body
and by the civil courts but not always followed by the British
sovereigns under whose royal prerogative the various military
codes had normally been promulgated. 1 3  Although the ex-
treme limitations upon court-martial jurisdiction imposed by
the first Mutiny Act were relaxed by succeeding Mutiny Acts,
we find that even as late as 1765 British court-martial jur-
isdiction was considerably restricted. Section XX, Article II
of the British Articles of that year permitted the trial by
court-martial of civil capital crimes and other civil offenses
only in places where there were no British civil courts. In
other places, trial for such crimes and offenses was to be held
in the civil courts. Jurisdiction over capital military offenses
was granted by specific articles of the code. Naturally
enough, therefore, the general article quoted earlier in this
text was limited to "crimes not capital," and even these crimes
had to have a military aspect by reason of being prejudicial to
good order and military discipline. As we shall see later
in this paper, this change from the general article of James II
has had a profound effect upon American military law lasting
to this very day.
With minor exceptions not material to our discussion,
the language of the above quoted British general article of
1765 is found in all American Articles of War up to and
including those of 1874, and the 1874 Articles remained in
13 See WINTHROP 929 (app. VI), quoting the First British Mutiny Act of
1689; see also Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959); CLODE, MILITARY AND
MARTIAL LAW 20 (2d ed. 1874) ; TYTLER, MILITARY LAW 18 (3d ed. 1814) ;
WINTHROP 19-20; BRITISH WAR OFFICF, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 10-11
(1939 reprint). There is considerable argument about the effect of this act on
court-martial jurisdiction, and the original act is often misquoted by limiting
its effect on non "life or limb" offenses to "time of peace." The material in the
citation to Tytler points out that the "time of peace" limitation was an
innovation of a Mutiny Act passed in Queen Anne's reign. Despite the apolo-
gistic interpretations of the effect of the First Mutiny Act which can be
found in some of the above citations and elsewhere, the author's version of
the matter would seem to be supported by the actual state of military
law during the reign of George III as reflected in the British Articles of
1765 discussed in the text. See also the limited use of the 1692 Code men-
tioned in note 12 supra; WALTON op. cit. supra note 12, at ch. XXVI.
[ VOL. 35
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effect until a major revision by Congress in 1916.11 It should
be noted that all but one of the clauses found in the present
Article 134 of the Uniform Code are found in the British
Code of 1765. The missing clause--conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces--did not appear in
the American Articles of War until the revision of 1916.
Thus, remembering that Gustavus Adolphus did deal with this
matter in his code after the fashion of his times, there is a
rather remarkable hiatus of almost three centuries in this one
respect.
In Section XV, Article XXIII, of the British Articles
of 1765, we find the ancestor of our other general article-
conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. The cited
article reads:
Whatsoever Commissioned Officer shall be convicted before a
General Court-martial, of behaving in a scandalous infamous Man-
ner, such as is unbecoming the Character of an Officer and a
Gentleman, shall be discharged from Our Service.
Hazarding a guess for which the author fears he can sup-
ply no authority, one might say that some deep-seated socio-
logical reason accounts for the presence in this code of such
an article and the absence of a similar article in the otherwise
detailed military codes of the preceding century. And indeed
it may be true that behavior "unbecoming the Character of an
Officer and a Gentlemen" appears as an offense in the 1765
Code because the notion of the English gentleman, and the
moral and ethical standards expected of him, had finally crys-
tallized and emerged in the eighteenth century, whereas the
much earlier and perhaps less complicated and exacting notion
of chivalry had already become outworn and was certainly less
adhered to, in the seventeenth century. Romantic as this may
be, those who know the course of legislation will probably feel
more inclined to suspect that the inclusion of the offense in
question came about as the result of a "scandalous infamous"
14 WINTHROP 953 (app. IX), quoting American Articles of War of 1775,
art. L; WINTHROP 961 (app. X), quoting 1776 Articles, § XVIII, art. 5;
WINTHROP 976 (app. XII), quoting 1806 Articles, art. 99; WINTHROP 986
(app. XIII), quoting 1874 Articles, art. 62.
1961 ]
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incident involving an officer that occurred shortly before the
article denouncing such conduct first made its appearance.
Whatever may be the true reason for this innovation, thiA gen-
eral article involving officers appears virtually unchanged in
the American Articles until the military code of 1806.15 In
the code of that year, the phrase "behaving in a scandalous, in-
famous manner" was deleted, probably in an effort to promote
better standards, and the article acquired its present form-
merely denouncing conduct unbecoming an officer and a gen-
tleman.16 Although no changes were made in the American
Articles of 1874, 17 the revision of 1916 added cadets to the per-
sons subject to this article "I and, as we know, the Uniform
Code added midshipmen."' Until the advent of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, dismissal (the word "discharge" was
used prior to the 1786 amendments to the American Articles)
was a mandatory sentence upon conviction. 20
As mentioned previously, it was not until the extensive
revision of the Articles of War in 1916 that the phrase "con-
duct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service"
appeared in the predecessor of our present Article 134 of the
Uniform Code. One other significant change was also made
15S WINTHROP 953 (app. 1X), quoting American Articles of War of 1775,
art. XLVII; WINTHROP 961 (app. X), quoting 1776 Articles, § XIV, art. 21;
WINTHROP 972 (app. XI), quoting 1786 Articles, art. 20. See DAVIS, op.
cit. supra note 9, at 468.
16 WINTHROP 976 (app. XII), quoting American Articles of War of 1806,
art. 83. Higher standards were, in fact, required under the new article.
See WINTHROP 710-11; Bent, Military Law and Courts-Martial 274-77 (6th
ed. 1868).17 WINTHROP 986 (app. XIII), quoting American Articles of 1874, art. 61.
28 Articles of War of 1916, ch. 418, § 3, art. 95, 39 Stat. 666.
19 See note 4 supra.
20 The original bill for the Uniform Code as submitted by the Department
of Defense retained the feature of mandatory dismissal. Hearings on H.R.
2498 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Aried Services,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1235 (1949). This was amended during the course
of the Senate hearings apparently at the request of the Navy. Hearings on
S. 857 and H.R. 4040 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 286 (1949). Dismissal had not been
a mandatory punishment for this offense in the Navy, such conduct having
been punished under an Article 134 type of general article in that service.
See NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDs § 99 (1937); Articles for the Government
of the Navy, art. 22, REv. STAT. § 1624 (1875). A recent Army study has
resulted in an Army recommendation that mandatory dismissal upon con-
viction of Article 133 be reinstated. REPORT BY THE CoMMITTEE ON THE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 16 (1960).
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in that year, and we will discuss that change first. The
1916 Article in question was Article 96, and it will be necessary
to set out in full both that article and the one it replaced,
Article 62 of the Articles of 1874. Article 62 provided:
All crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects, which
officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline, though not mentioned in the fore-
going articles of war, are to be taken cognizance of by a general,
or a regimental garrison, or field-officers' court-martial, according
to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the dis-
cretion of such court.21
Article 96 read:
Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, all conduct
of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service, and all
crimes or offenses not capital, of which persons subject to military
law may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general or
special or summary court-martial, according to the nature and
degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court.22
It will readily be noticed that the phrase "though not
mentioned in these articles" has been placed at the head
of the sentence in Article 96. This was not done merely as
a result of a grammarian's exercise in better phrasing. Prior
to the decision of the -Supreme Court of the United States in
Grafton v. United States,23 it had long been held that the
"crimes not capital" clause of Article 62 of the Articles of
1874 was qualified by the "prejudice of good order and
military discipline" clause. The similar British general
article had been given the same interpretation. In Grafton,
however, the Supreme Court intimated that the "crimes not
capital" clause of Article 62 was not limited by the "prejudice
of good order and military discipline" clause, and Article 96
21 WINTHRoP 991 (app. XIII).
2239 Stat. 666 (1916). It should also be noticed that the phrase "which
officers and soldiers may be guilty of" appearing in Article 62 of the 1874
Articles was broadened to include all "persons subject to military law" in
Article 96 of the 1916 Articles.
23 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
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of the 1916 Code was rephrased accordingly. 24 There was a
sound historical reason, however, for the earlier interpretation
of the "crimes not capital" clause of Article 62 of the 1874
Article, for this article was a direct descendant of the general
article of the British Articles of War of 1765, with the same
phraseology in all material respects; and, as we have already
seen in our discussion of that general article, its "crimes
not capital" clause granted no court-martial jurisdiction at
all over noncapital civil crimes unless they were divested of
their purely civil nature because of being prejudicial to good
order and military discipline. What jurisdiction there was
over crimes of a strictly civil nature under the 1765 British
Code was specifically granted in another article of the code,
with express limitations regarding the place where the crime
was committed.
Probably the most important change in the 1916 general
article, however, is the addition of the "conduct of a nature
to bring discredit upon the military service" clause. It would
certainly suit the convenience of the author, and undoubtedly
would bring relief to the reader, if it could merely be said
that this clause was simply a recognition that something
had been left out of this general article for many centuries,
that at last it was recognized that unspecified offenses in-
volving the civilian populace which might bring discredit upon
our arms were as important as unspecified offenses within
the military which were disruptive of military discipline.
Unfortunately, and even surprisingly, the matter cannot be
passed over quite so lightly, for the first memorandum ac-
24 COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED NEW ARTICLES OF WAR WITH THE PRESENT
ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER RELATED STATUTES 50 (1912) (War Dep't
document accompanying transmission of proposed new articles to Chairman,
Military Committee, House of Rerepresentatives) ; Revision of the Articles
of War, Hearing on H.R. 23628 Before the House Committee Ol Military
Affairs, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82 (1912) (Statement of Gen. Crowder);
See "Explanation" accompanying S. 1032, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1913);
COMPARATIVE PRINT SHOWING S. 3191 WITH THE PRESENT ARTICLES OF
WAR AND OTHER RELATED STATUTES 58 (1916) (Sen. Comm. Print prepared
for the use of the Sen. Comm. on Military Affairs, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.).
For the original interpretation of the "crimes not capital" clause of Article 62
of the 1874 Articles and its British counterpart, see WINTHROP 723-24 and
materials there cited. See also WINTHROP 990 (app. XIII), quoting 1874
Articles, arts. 58-59.
[ VOL.. 35
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companying the proposed new legislation, written in 1912,
had this to say about the clause in question:
The new language introduced in the article is for the purpose
of covering the cases of retired enlisted men who are guilty of conduct
(not crimes) which is discreditable and yet not directly prejudicial
to discipline; such as refusing to make proper provision for the
support of their families, or the disgraceful non-payment of a debt
incurred for the necessaries of life.25
In the same year, we find the then Judge Advocate
General, Brigadier General Enoch H. Crowder, making the
following statement concerning the discredit clause before the
House Committee on Military Affairs, which was considering
a House bill containing the proposed new military code:
That [the discredit clause] was inserted for a single purpose.
We have a great many retired noncommissioned officers and soldiers
distributed throughout the body of our population and a great many
retired officers. If the retired officer does anything discreditable
to the service or to his official position, we can try him under the
sixty-first article of war for conduct "unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman." We cannot try the noncommissioned officer or soldier
under that article, nor can we try him for conduct prejudicial to good
order and military discipline; because the act of a man on the retired
list, away from any post, cannot reasonably be said to affect military
discipline .... Sometimes it is because of refusal to support their
families while on retired pay; complaints of creditors come into the
office; . . . I wanted that language in there to try those retired
soldiers whose cases became flagrant.
Despite General Crowder's stated restrictions on the new
clause, fears were expressed that it was too broad and sweep-
ing, and the committee chairman suggested that it be deleted.2 6
A later memorandum on the subject, that accompanying
Senate Bill 1032 in 1913, commences its explanation bravely
enough but, unfortunately, loses force and becomes rather
25 ColipAa.SON OP THE PROPosED NENw ARscLEs op WAR, mipra note 24.
(Emphasis added.)
26 Rezvsion of the Articles of War, Hearing on H.R. 23628, supra note 24,
at 83-84.
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hopelessly involved in the field of enlisted retirement as it
moves along. It stated:
The clause "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
military service" has been interpolated in order to cover clearly
conduct on the part of enlisted men, particularly retired enlisted men,
which would tend to discredit the service but which at present does
not constitute a criminal offense, and which is not clearly prejudicial
to good order and military discipline because of the fact that the
offender is at the time not directly associated with a military
command.27
In what is apparently the last piece of written legislative
history relating to Article 96, the "Comparative Print" ac-
companying Senate Bill 3191 in 1916, the discredit clause is
not mentioned at all, although other changes in the article
are explained.2 8 Parenthetically, it may be of interest to note
that the 1916 Articles, after many and various vicissitudes,
were finally enacted into law only as part of the Army Ap-
propriation Act for the fiscal year 1917.29
The newborn chick cautiously peeped from the egg,
however, in the discussion of the freshly enacted Article 96,
found in the 1917 Manual for Courts-Martial. After stating
that the "principal" object of including the clause dealing
with discreditable conduct was to provide a remedy with
respect to errant retired enlisted men-making again the refer-
ence to those who were apparently finding it difficult to live
on their retired pay-it said:
There is, however, a limited field for the application of this
part of the general article to soldiers on the active list in cases where
their discreditable conduct is not made punishable by any specific
article or by the other parts of the general article.30
When World War I had shown the necessity for once more
amending the Articles of War (not, however, Article 96)
27 See"Explanation" accompanying S. 1032, supra note 24.
28 CO MPAIA-VE PRINT SHOWING S. 3191, supra note 24.
2939 Stat. 619 (1916).
so MCM, 1917, para. 446 (II). One might note the legal hedging and
uncertainty caused by the absence of the discredit clause in the earlier articles
as disclosed in Winthrop's discussion of the prejudice of good order and
military discipline clause. WINTHROP 723-32 n.17.
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and the 1921 Manual for Courts-Martial was promulgated to
announce the amendments of 1920 and other changes in
military law prompted by the war, the authors of that Manual
must have found that the discredit to the service clause of
Article of War 96 had more than the "limited field" en-
visioned by the authors of the 1917 Manual. The new Manual,
after suggesting various applications of the clause to members
on active duty, simply stated that "another principal" object
was to take care of the case of retired members. 31 This
marked the beginning of a steady retreat from the position
taken by the drafters of the 1916 Articles, for we find that
the 1928 Manual speaks of retired enlisted persons as being
only "one object" of the discreditable conduct clause,3 2 and
the 1949 Manual omits all mention of retired enlisted persons
in this connection.3 3 The drafters of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice were either unaware of this history of the
clause or thought it unworthy of consideration, for they are
completely silent about it, 34 and the 1951 Manual also makes
no mention of retired enlisted persons in its discussion of
discreditable conduct. 35 As for case law, the most cursory
glance through the indexes of both the .Court-Martial Reports
and the Reports of the Court of Military Appeals 36 will dis-
close cases far too numerous to cite of persons on active duty
having been tried and convicted of offenses only remotely
prejudicial to good order and military discipline but clearly
"of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces." It is
obvious, therefore, that the limitations which the authors of
the 1916 Articles attempted to place upon the clause were
unjustified at the time, never really obtained a foothold in the
law, and have since been deservedly forgotten.
31 MCM, 1921, para. 446 (II).
32 MCM, 1928, para. 152(b).
33 MCM, 1949, para. 183 (b).34 Hearings on HR. 2498, supra note 20, at 1235.
35 MCM, 1951, para. 213(b). As far as the Army is concerned, present
policy is that complaints or accusations against retired persons not on active
duty are "normally" outside the responsibility of that Military Department
and are to be pursued through the civil courts. Army Regulations 600-10,
para. 25a(3) (1958).
36 See citators and index to 1-25 C.M.R. (1958); index and tables to 1-10
U.S.C.M.A.
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Thus we come to an end of our formal history. However,
because of the very nature of the subject, it will be necessary
to dip back into the past from time to time in the following
paragraphs.
CRIMES AND OFENSES NOT CAPITAL
To one reading Article 134 without possessing a knowl-
edge of its background and interpretation, it might seem that
the apparently unlimited prohibition against the commission
of "crimes and offenses not capital" found in that Article
would cover all manner of noncapital crimes and offenses
not otherwise specifically set out in the Uniform Code, re-
gardless of the jurisdictional source of the particular offense
in question. Consequently, it might appear that offenses
against municipal, state, and foreign laws were intended to
be included. Such, however, is not the case.
This question was somewhat vividly brought to the fore
in the hearings on the Uniform Code held before a subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Armed Services. There, Mr. Felix
Larkin, then Assistant General Counsel, Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense, and one of the chief spokesmen for the
Uniform Code, was asked what was meant by the "crimes and
offenses not capital" clause. When the ensuing conversation
indicated some confusion as to whether state criminal laws
were intended to be within the scope of the clause, Mr. Larkin
clarified the matter as follows:
• . . I believe a violation of a State law would be punishable
under the code to the extent it is construed as conduct to the prejudice
of good order and discipline but not to the extent of the specific State
law itself. We purposely want to avoid trying personnel who
happen to commit an offense under State law, by virtue of the
tremendous variations between State laws and by virtue of the
necessity that would fall upon the court of trying them according to
the procedural practices and perhaps even the substantive provisions
of one State as against another. But, if the act is to the prejudice
of good order and discipline, the fact that it also incidentally is a
State law violation as well would bring it under this jurisdiction
but not triable as the State would try it.a7
37 Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1239 (1949).
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One will immediately observe, of course, that Mr. Larkin
neglected to mention that the discredit to the armed forces
clause might come into play here also, but this omission was
no doubt due to an oversight. As we shall see later, in actual
practice it is the discredit clause, and not the prejudice to
discipline clause, which is normally considered in case of
acts which happen also to violate state or foreign laws. How-
ever, Mr. Larkin's assertion that a violation of state law
would not as such be triable under the "crimes and offenses
not capital clause" represented the interpretation given to
that clause in the 1921 Manual for Courts-Martial and in all
succeeding Manuals.3 8  Although the language of the 1917
Manual had apparently adopted a broader view which was
certainly subject to an interpretation that military prosecu-
tion for violations of state and even foreign laws would be
permitted under the "crimes and offenses not capital" clause,39
it seems that the law must have changed in this respect at
some time between 1917 and 1921, for the contrary assertions
in the 1921 Manual, along with other changes, were stated
in the introduction to that Manual to have been based on
"the results of decisions made by the Office of the Judge
Advocate General and the War Department." 40
Certainly at present it can be said that the "crimes and
offenses not capital" clause is restricted to violations of federal
laws or local laws enacted under the authority of Congress,
such as those found in the Criminal Code of the District of
Columbia. And even such laws, in order to be properly
utilized under the clause in question, must be applicable in
the place where the offense is committed. 41 This interpretation
of Article 134 was crystallized by the Court of Military Ap-
38 MCM, 1921, para. 446 (III); MCM, 1923, para. 152(c); MCM, 1949,
para. 183(c); MCM, 1951, para. 213(c).
39 MCM, 1917, para. 446 (III); see WINTHROP 721.
40 MCf, 1921 (introduction at XI).
4 1MCM, 1951, para. 213(c). These principles should not be confused
with the entirely different principles found in the second paragraph of para-
graph 12 7(c) of the Manual which deal with the use of federal and District
of Columbia laws for the determination of maxinum punishment.
19611]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
peals in United States v. Grosso.4  In that case it was stated
in the majority opinion:
A violation of a state statute does not by itself constitute a
violation of Article 134.... The violation must, in fact, and in law,
amount to conduct to the discredit of the Armed Forces. Not every
violation of a state statute is discrediting conduct. Undoubtedly, if
we were to examine the statutes of the several states, we would find
hundreds of acts which are made locally punishable but which would
not be violations of military law. 43
In dissenting on other grounds, Judge Latimer, after quoting
the statement of Mr. Larkin set out earlier in this article,
stated :
That quotation merely restates the rule long established in mil-
itary law to the effect that the proper yardstick to be used to de-
termine the criminality of an act made punishable by a state statute
is its impact on good government in the military community. The
purpose of Article 134 of the Code. . . is to prescribe that measuring
rod and, while the state statute may for state purposes, define the
crime, before it becomes a military offense the prohibited conduct
must, as the Article provides, have a direct and proximate impact
on good order, discipline, or credit of the service.44
It would not be proper to take leave of this problem,
however, without pointing out that under some conditions
state laws become, in effect, federal laws under the Federal
42 7 U.S.C.M.A. 566, 23 C.M.R. 30 (1957). The somewhat related proposi-
tion that a violation of state law, or municipal or foreign law, is not auto-
matically an offense of a nature to bring discredit on the military has been
law in the Army at least from the time of the 1928 Manual for Courts-
Martial. MCM, 1928, para. 152(b). Prior to this time, however, it seems
that the contrary was the case. MCM, 1921, paras. 446 (II, III). And in
the Navy, it appears that a violation of state, municipal, or foreign law was
considered to be, per se, conduct "to the prejudice of good order and discipline"
in violation of Article 22 of the Articles for the Government of the Navy up
to the time of the passage of the Uniform Code. NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS
.§ 98 (1937). However, the language of Navy Article 22 differed materially
from the Army general article. The mentioned Article 22 read: "Offenses
not specified.-Al offenses committed by persons belonging to the Navy which
are not specified in the foregoing articles shall be punished as a court-martial
may direct."
43 United States v. Grosso, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 566, 571, 23 C.M.R. 30, 35
(1957).44 1d. at 572-73, 23 C.M.R. at 36-37.
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Assimilative Crimes Act,45 with respect to acts or omissions
occurring in places which are within the state in question
but under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the
United States. In such an event, a violation of a noncapital
criminal provision of the state law is punishable as a violation
of federal law under the "crimes and offenses not capital"
clause.46
Of course, an offense must in fact be not capital in order
properly to be chargeable under the "crimes and offenses not
capital" clause. This limitation, however, has a much more
far-reaching and sweeping effect than might at first be thought.
Suppose, for example, a member of the military service com-
mits an offense denounced as a capital offense by a federal
statute, other than the Uniform Code, for which he could be
tried in a federal court, and the offense is not one found in
any specific article of the Uniform Code. Suppose, further,
that the offense in question is both disruptive of military
discipline and of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces. Now, obviously, the offender could not be tried for
this offense under the "crimes and offenses not capital" clause
of Article 134, but could he be tried for the offense on a non-
capital basis under the theory of one or both of the other
two clauses? By a divided court, the Court of Military
Appeals, in the case of United States v. French 47 has an-
swered this question in the negative. Judge Latimer, the
author of the principal opinion, after comparing the Articles
of War of James II with the American Articles of War of
45 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
40United States v. Picotte, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 196, 30 C.M.R. 196 (1961);
United States v. Wright, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 202, 30 C.M.R. 202 (1961). Both
cases involved the crime of kidnapping in violation of an assimilated state
statute.
-1 10 U.S.C.M.A. 171, 27 C.M.R. 245 (1959). Judge Quinn, in his opinion
purportedly "concurring in the result" (there were other offenses sustaining
the sentence as affirmed by the intermediate appellate tribunal), apparently
felt that the accused could be convicted under Article 134 on the noncapital
basis of service discrediting conduct despite the similarity of language between
the allegations of the specification in question and the provisions of a Federal
statute denouncing a capital offense. Judge Ferguson, concurring in the result,
stated that he was in general agreement with most of the principal opinion
but that his concurrence was limited because of choice of language therein
which he deemed "unfortunate." Judge Ferguson did not specify these choices
of language.
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1775 and apparently not noticing that the "crimes not capital"
clause was a British innovation found in the British Articles
of 1765 and not an American innovation, stated:
In light of the time and circumstances under which Congress
enacted the precursor statutes to Article 134, we believe that body
intended to erect an absolute barrier against military courts trying
peacetime offenses which permitted the imposition of the death penalty
in civilian courts. Apparently the legislative department of the
Government intended that category of crimes should be tried before
a civilian court and jury under civilian rights and privileges. If
we are certain in that regard, then it is positive that this case falls
under the bar for if the specification as herein alleged was pleaded
in one charge in an indictment, a conviction would permit the im-
position of a death penalty by a Federal civilian judge. Following
this hypothesis one step further, if an indictment was returned which
did not include an allegation that the information related to national
defense [the allegation which made the offense capital], then only
a ten-year penalty could be imposed and the case would not be
capital.48
Elsewhere in his opinion, Judge Latimer pointed out that
since all federal capital offenses would necessarily tend to
bring discredit on the military services, to permit the trial
of such capital offenses on the basis of this clause would
render meaningless the "crimes and offenses not capital" clause.
The opinion went on to state that the same reasoning would
prevent trial of such an offense on a noncapital basis as
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman under Article
133. If, however, the offense in question, although capital
under a federal statute, is also specifically denounced by the
Uniform Code, it can then be tried by court-martial under
the appropriate specific article whether capital or noncapital,
for the specific article would amount to a direct legislative
grant of court-martial jurisdiction with respect to the offense
denounced by that article.4 9
48 Id. at 178-79, 27 C.M.R. at 252-53. The historical error mentioned in
the text of this paper would not affect the result of the French decision.49 Id. at 180, 27 C.M.R. at 254.
[ VOL. 35
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
THE PROBLEm OF DEMENITMNESS
The Article 134 type of general article has been at-
tacked on a number of occasions as lacking in that degree of
definiteness constitutionally required of criminal statutes.
This is not particularly surprising since the requisite elements
of definiteness in the ordinary civilian criminal statute are
normally, except in the case of crimes well known to the
common law,5 0 spelt out in the statute itself, and therefore it
could be expected that one unfamiliar with military law and
traditions might have some difficulty with such phrases as
"crimes and offenses not capital," "disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces," and "conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces." However, to a military lawyer or even
to a military man who is not a lawyer, these terms have at
least as much meaning as do the terms murder, assault,
larceny, or embezzlement to the nonmilitary member of the
bar. And it is precisely for this reason that the legal at-
tacks on the general article have failed. Two cases, one
decided in the last century and one in this century, should
suffice to settle the problem before us.
In Dynes v. Hoover,5 ' decided in 1858, the Supreme
Court of the United States had before it the case of a sailor
who had been convicted by a Naval court-martial of "attempt-
ing to desert" in violation of the thirty-second Article for the
Government of the Navy. That article, the Navy general ar-
ticle, read: "All crimes committed by persons belonging to the
navy, which are not specified in the foregoing articles, shall
be punished according to the laws and customs in such cases
at sea." The plaintiff, Dynes, who had brought suit for false
imprisonment against Hoover, a United States Marshal who
had imprisoned him pursuant to the naval conviction, com-
50 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1958) ("assault with intent to commit murder
or rape") ; 18 U.S.C. § 114 (1958) ("with intent to maim or disfigure, cuts.
. . ."); 18 U.S.C. § 153 (1958) ("embezzles"); 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1958)
("Whoever embezzles, steals. . . .") ; 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1958) ("Murder is the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought."). There are
many others.
53 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858).
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plained among other things that the above quoted article
was too indefinite. In holding that the article was a suf-
ficiently legal criminal statute upon which to base a conviction,
the Court said:
And when offenses and crimes are not given in terms or by
definition, the want of it may be supplied by a comprehensive en-
actment, such as the 32d article of the rules for the government of
the navy, which means that courts-martial have jurisdiction of such
crimes as are not specified, but which have been recognised to be
crimes and offences by the usages in the navy of all nations, and
that they shall be punished according to the laws and customs of the
sea. Notwithstanding the apparent indeterminateness of such a pro-
vision, it is not liable to abuse; for what those crimes are, and how
they are to be punished, is well known by practical men in the navy
and army, and by those who have studied the law of courts-
martial, and the offences of which the different courts-martial have
cognizance. 52
In 1953, the matter was raised again, this time before
the Court of Military Appeals." One Frantz had been con-
victed by court-martial of wrongfully having in his possession
with intent to deceive an armed forces liberty pass, well know-
ing the same to be false, in violation of Article 134. He
appealed his conviction contending that Article 134, as ap-
plied to his case, was unconstitutional because of vagueness.
Despite the fact that the appellant had thus limited his con-
stitutional objections to the application of the Article to the
facts of his particular case, the court felt that it was necessary
to determine whether the Article was sufficiently definite "on
its face and generally as well." 54 In determining that the
Article was sufficiently definite, the court said:
Surely the third clause of the Article is not vague. However,
we cannot ignore the conceivable presence of uncertainty in the first
two clauses. Assuming that civilian precedents in the field are
applicable in full force to the military community, we do not per-
ceive in the Article vagueness or uncertainty to an unconstitutional
52 d. at 82.
53 United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 7 C.M.R. 37 (1953).54 Id. at 163, 7 C.M.R. at 39.
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degree. The provision, as it appears in the Uniform Code, is no
novelty to service criminal law. . . On the contrary, it has
been part of our military law since 1775, and directly traces its
origin to British sources .... It must be judged, therefore, not in
vacuo, but in the context in which the years have placed it ...
That the clauses under scrutiny have acquired the core of a settled
and understandable content of meaning is clear from the no less
than forty-seven different offenses cognizable thereunder explicitly
included in the Table of Maximum Punishments of the Manual.
55
After pointing out that a certain minimum amount of in-
distinction would always be present in legislation of this
nature which would have to be dealt with on a case to case
basis, the court stressed the military importance of the general
article in the following manner:
[T]he briefest of terminal references must be made to the
presence of special and highly relevant considerations growing out
of the essential disciplinary demands of the military service. These
are at once so patent and so compelling as to dispense with the
necessity for their enumeration-much less their argumentative
development. 8
It should be quite clear that the same principles that
appear in the two cases we have discussed in connection with
Article 134 would apply with equal force to Article 13 3 .57
T= DocTRaiN Or PRE-EMPTION
Before becoming too deeply involved in this doctrine, if
it can be called a doctrine, it will be necessary to explain
what is meant, and what is not meant, by "pre-emption."
This will be done in inverse order.
First, the doctrine of pre-emption does not prohibit a
multiplication of charges, that is, charging one aspect of
an act under a specific article and another aspect of the
SIbid.6 Id. at 163-64, 7 C.M.1. at 39-40.
87United States v. Lee, C.M. 348951, 4 C.M.R. 185, petition for review
denied, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 712, 4 C.M.R. 173 (1952).
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same act under Article 134 or 133, or both, provided the
other aspect so charged is a cognizable offense under the
general article in question. 58 If and when such a duplication
may prejudice an accused at all it is not because of any
doctrine of pre-emption but rather because of the rules govern-
ing multiplication of charges.5 9 The author is not to be
understood as suggesting an indiscriminate use of such a
procedure. Unnecessary multiplication normally serves only
to confuse the members of the court, to make life difficult for
the law officer in drafting his instructions, to lead to pos-
sibilities of error with regard to the sentence, and to lay
the proceedings open to charges by the defense that the
accused is being improperly portrayed as a "bad man." 60
Secondly, the doctrine of pre-emption has nothing to do
with singly charging an offense denounced by a specific article
as a violation of Article 134 or 133 when no elements of
the specific offense are left out of the specification and no new
elements are added. There would normally be no point
in doing this anyway.6 1
The doctrine of pre-emption does come into play, however,
or rather, the question arises as to whether the prohibition of
58 It might be argued that the discussion of Article 134 in the Manual for
Courts-Martial, 1951, which, with respect to each of the three clauses, appears
to restrict the operation of the Article to offenses not made punishable by a
specific article (MCM, 1951, para. 213(a) (b) (c)) would, in close cases at
least, prohibit such multiplication of charges with respect to Article 134.
However, this restriction would appear to rest on a tender reed, for the
Article itself in introducing its three proscriptions uses the phrase "though"
not specifically mentioned in the Code, not "unless" specifically so mentioned.
Article 133 has no restrictive language of any kind, and, indeed, double
charges are expressly permitted here. See the penultimate paragraph of the
"Discussion," MCM, 1951, para. 212. The above cited provisions of the
Manual pertaining to Article 134 should not be confused with the provisions
against unreasonable multiplication of charges found in paragraph 26(b) of
the Manual.
59 United States v. Middleton, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 54, 30 C.M.R. 54 (1960).
60 Ibid.
61 With respect to an Article 134 charge, at least, if there is any particular
reason for using such a procedure it will probably be an illegal one and will
be stricken down by the courts. See Rosborough v. Rossell, 150 F.2d 809
(1st Cir. 1945); WINTHOP 721; compare Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S.
333 (1907). And if a specification is laid under Article 134 which could
have been laid under a specific article, the court-martial, reviewing, or appellate
authorities will simply change the charge so that it will recite the appropriate
specific article. United States v. Hallett, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 378, 15 C.M.R. 378
(1954); United States v. Deller, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 12 C.M.R. 165 (1953).
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the doctrine applies, when an attempt is made to charge an
offense under Article 134, or Article 133, which is similar to,
but not the same as, an offense specifically proscribed by the
Code either because one or more elements have been added
or left out or because the offense charged otherwise lies in the
same field of criminality as the specifically denounced offense
in question. In such a case, the problem always is one as to
whether Congress, in enacting the specific article, intended
completely to cover-to pre-empt-in that article the entire
field of criminality pertaining to that particular department of
crime, and consequently would brook nothing greater or less
and had turned its face away from the possibility of any non-
identical general article twins. This, obviously, is a problem
of statutory construction of the specific articles, not one of
construing the general articles.
Prior to the Uniform Code and for a relatively short time
thereafter, this doctrine appeared not to have been recognized
by military appellate tribunals. Indeed, the theory current
in those days seemed to be that the Article 134: type of general
article encompassed, as stated by Winthrop, "acts which,
while of the same general nature as those included in certain
specific Articles, are wanting in some single characteristic
which distinguishes the latter . . ." and acts similar to those
specifically denounced but "which lack the gravamen expressed
in the term 'knowingly,' 'wilfully,' or the like"-all this
without paying any particular attention to any possible ex-
clusionary construction of the specific articles themselves. 62
In United States v Norris,63 decided by the Court of
Military Appeals early in 1953, the accused had been found
guilty of the offense of wrongful appropriation in violation
of Article 121 of the Code. That Article denounces the
offenses of larceny and wrongful appropriation and requires
that there be an intent permanently to deprive, defraud,
6 2 WINTHROP 725-26; United States v. Norris, C.M. 354500, 7 C.M.R. 412
(1952), rev'd, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 8 C.M.R. 36 (1953). A rather generalized
theory of pre-emption was apparently recognized in England, however, at an
early date. See SAMUr, MILITARY LAw 688 (1816).
632 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 8 C.M.R. 36 (1953). See also United States v.
Bridges, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 30 C.M.R. 96 (1961).
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or appropriate in the case of larceny, and an intent temporarily
to do one or more of these things in the case of wrongful
appropriation. Because of instructional difficulties at the
trial, the board of review (an intermediate military appellate
tribunal) determined that the accused could not legally be
convicted of having the temporary intent necessary for wrong-
ful appropriation, and, acting on the basis of prior service
precedents, sustained only a conviction for "wrongful taking"
without such temporary intent in violation of Article 134.
In reversing the conviction, the Court of Military Appeals
said:
We cannot grant to the services unlimited authority to eliminate
vital elements from common law crimes and offenses expressly de-
fined by Congress and permit the remaining elements to be punished
as an offense under Article 134.
We are persuaded, as apparently the drafters of the Manual
were, that Congress has, in Article 121, covered the entire field
of criminal conversion for military law. We are not disposed to
add a third conversion offense to those specifically defined. It
follows that there is no offense known as "wrongful taking" requiring
no elements of specific intent, embraced by Article 134 of the
Code.64
As might be noticed, the decision in this case is at least
partially based on the fact that the drafters of the Manual,
in their supporting material, had stated that wrongful ap-
propriation, as defined by Article 121, included "offenses
heretofore known as misappropriation, misapplication, joy-
riding, wrongful taking and using, and wrongful conversion."
Actually, in his concurring opinion, the late Judge Brosman
indicated that this was the principal, if not the only, reason
for his concurrence. 65
In another case decided by the Court of Military Ap-
peals in 1953, the case of United States v. Deller,66 the ac-
64 United States v. Norris, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 239-40, 8 C.M.R. 36, 39-40(1953).65 Ibid.
66 3 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 12 C.M.1. 165 (1953). When an accused raises the
issue of pre-emption, he normally does so with one or more of the following
reasons or contentions in mind: that the pre-empted act is no offense at all;
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cused had been convicted of absence without leave "with the
wrongful intent of permanently preventing completion of his
basic training and useful service as a soldier" in violation of
Article 134. Article 86 of the Uniform Code, which specii-
cally makes punishable absence without leave, nowhere men-
tions such an intent. However, Article 85, the desertion
Article, defines one type of desertion as an unauthorized ab-
sence with intent to shirk important service. The Court of
Military Appeals, after holding that basic training con-
stituted "important service," affirmed a conviction of de-
sertion with intent to shirk such service in violation of Article
85. In the course of its opinion the court said:
[Oiffenses sounding in unauthorized absence may be reached and
penalized only under the provisions of Articles 85, 86, and 87
of the Code . . . proscribing, respectively, desertion, absence
without leave, and missing movement. With a single exception not
relevant here [probably breach of restriction is meant; actually,
there are others, such as breach of quarantine], there are simply
no offenses of an unauthorized absence type cognizable under
Article 134G7
This case turned upon statutory construction of the absence
without leave Article (Article 86) found in the discussion of
that Article in the Manual, wherein it was said that the
Article was designed to cover "every case not elsewhere
provided for" in which a member of the armed forces was
through his own fault not at the place where he was required
to be at the prescribed time.68
In United States v. Hallett,69 the accused was tried under
a specification alleging that, being before the enemy, he was
guilty of cowardly conduct in that he wrongfully failed
to accompany his platoon on a combat patrol, in violation
of Article 99. By exceptions, the court-martial found him
that the pre-empting offense carries a lesser penalty; or that the instructions
upon the elements of the pre-empted offense do not fit the elements of the pre-
empting offense.
67 Id. at 413, 12 C.M.R. at 169.
6sMCM, 1951, para. 165; United States v. Johnson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 174, 11
C.M.R. 174 (1953), relied on by the court in the Deller case.
69 4 U.S.C.M.A. 378, 15 C.M.P,. 378 (1954).
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not guilty of this offense but guilty merely of wrongfully
failing, while being before the enemy, to accompany his
platoon on the patrol, in violation of Article 134. The pre-
decessor of Article 99 of the Uniform Code, Article 75 of the
Articles of War, had contained a clause making punishable
the act of one who "before the enemy, misbehaves himself."
This generalized provision had been left out of Article 99,
despite the protests of the then Judge Advocate General
before the congressional committee considering the Uniform
Code. No provision in Article 99 covered the conduct of
which the accused was found guilty. The court held that
under the circumstances, Congress had covered in Article
99 the "entire range of offenses which are assimilable to mis-
behavior before the enemy" 70 and that no room was left in
this area for the application of Article 134. The court did
sustain, however, under the finding of the court-martial, a
conviction of unauthorized absence in violation of Article 86.
The case of United States v. Frayer 71 represents an in-
teresting split of opinion on this matter within the Court of
Military Appeals. The accused was convicted of communi-
cating a threat, an offense for which the Manual provides a
sample specification 72 and an entry in the Table of Maximum
Punishments, 73 both listed under Article 134. On appeal,
the accused contended that this sort of offense was pre-
empted by Article 127 of the Code, the article denouncing ex-
tortion. The court, with Judge Ferguson dissenting on this
point, held that the act of communicating a threat was prop-
erly an offense in violation of Article 134. Judge Latimer's
rationale in this connection is particularly illuminating:
There seems to be some misapprehension about the power of
Congress to make one act a crime under two or more punitive
Articles. There is no such proscription, for the bar that has been
erected is that an accused shall not be twice tried or punished for
the same offense. But that is not to say that the Government
io Id. at 382, 15 C.M.R. at 382.
71 11 U.S.C.M.A. 600, 29 C.M.R. 416 (1960).
72 MCM, 1951 (app. 6c, Spec. No. 171).
73 MCM, 1951, para. 127(c).
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cannot elect to prosecute once under any statute which has been
violated. By way of illustration, when a member of the military
misses a movement, he can be charged with violating either Article
86 [absence without leave] or Article 87 [missing movement] ...
Examples could be multiplied, but from the foregoing it ought to
be evident that, unless there are clear indications that Congress,
by enacting one statute, intended not to permit prosecution under
any other law, then the Government may choose which punitive
Article will be used to support the specification and charge.74
Judge Latimer, as had Judge Quinn, then found that there
was no indication that Congress had intended to pre-empt
the field of threats when it enacted Article 127. Judge
Ferguson, in dissenting on this point, indicated that he would
approach the problem of pre-emption by finding evidence
of legislative intent in the phrase "Though not specifically
mentioned in this chapter" [Code] appearing in Article 134
itself.75  He felt that Article 134 should generally be limited
to military offenses and those crimes not specifically delineated
by the punitive articles.
There have been two recent cases on this subject. In one,
United States v. McCormick,76 the accused was convicted of
assault and battery upon a child under the age of sixteen in
violation of Article 134 '7 and, on appeal, contended that this
offense was pre-empted by the assault article, Article 128.
This Article denounces ordinary assault and two kinds of
aggravated assault, no mention being made of assaults upon
children. Judge Ferguson, again referring to his concept
that the phrase "Though not specifically mentioned in this
chapter" [Code] was one of limitation, held that the offense
in question was pre-empted but that the error thereby caused
was de minimis in view of the other offenses of which the
accused stood convicted. Judge Quinn's opinion was neutral
74 United States v. Frayer, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 600, 607, 29 C.M.R. 416, 423
(1960). (Emphasis added.)
75 See note 58 sipra.
76 12 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 30 C.M.R. 26 (1960).
77 The Manual contains a specification for this offense and an entry there-
for in the Table of Maximum Punishments, both listed under Article 134.
MCM, 1951, para. 127(c), Table of Maximum Punishments; MCM, 1951
(app. 6c, Spec. No. 125).
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on the question of pre-emption, and Judge Latimer, after
noting that the three opinions resulted in no law being decided
on the matter of pre-emption, stated that there was no
congressional intent to blanket the entire field of assaults
with Article 128.
In the other case, United States v. PiCotte78 the accused
was charged with kidnapping in violation of Article 134.
The case fell under the "crimes and offenses not capital" clause
since under the circumstances the provisions of the Colorado
kidnapping statute had been assimilated under the Federal
Assimilative Grimes Act. On appeal, the aicused contended
that the kidnapping charge was pre-empted by Article 97
of the Code, which proscribes the offense of unlawful de-
tention. Judge Latimer, using the same approach employed
by him in earlier cases, held that the offense of kidnapping
was not pre-empted by Article 97, principally on the ground
that, in that Article, Congress had intended only to define
the less serious offense of false arrest or false imprisonment
and had not intended to cover the more serious offense of
kidnapping. Judge Quinn concurred, and Judge Ferguson,
although he concurred in the result on the ground that there
could be no possibility of pre-emption under his view of
Article 97 (he would limit the article to military abuses of
the power to detain), nevertheless gave notice that he had
not retreated from his theory of the doctrine of pre-emption
as expressed in earlier cases.
It would appear that the doctrine of pre-emption as ex-
plained at the beginning of this chapter and as expounded
in Judge Latimer's opinions, which now seem to express
the views of the majority of the court, would apply to
questions of pre-emption arising under Article 133 as well as
to those arising under Article 134. If the matter is to be
controlled by reference to the intent of the legislature in
covering, or not covering, in a specific article the whole field
of criminality to which that Article pertains, and if it is
found that the legislature did intend to cover that field
78 12 U.S.C.M.A. 196, 30 C.M.R. 196 (1961).
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entirely in the Article in question, then it is difficult to
imagine how there could be any room left in that field
for the operation of other concepts, such as conduct un-
becoming an officer and a gentleman. 9
THE TnuE NATURn oF THE GiDNFAL ARTiLEs
It is very easy to become somewhat overly aware of case
law in connection with any research of a legal problem in-
volving the general articles. Indeed, and perhaps to his
ultimate dismay, a member of the legal profession nurtured
in the case by case or Holmesian doom theory of the study
of law can become quite bogged down in a veritable morass
of legal decisions and opinions on this subject that can well
turn out to be a somewhat annoying form of non-stare decisis
law. This apparent anomaly suggests a comparison with
certain procedural aspects of the romanesque legal systems
on the European Continent. As any student of comparative
law well knows, in those systems case law is used only as a
sort of guide or appeal to reason, and when the chips are
down on a difficult legal point and the case is ripe for de-
cision the judge will go back to the basic legal principles of
the statute, unadulterated by any legal gloss-particularly
case law.80 Our general articles, except for the "crimes or
offenses not capital" clause of Article 134, lend themselves
peculiarly well to this type of approach, for they seek to
express theories or principles of guilt as distinguished from
mere denunciations of certain prohibited acts. Whether this
is due to the fact that at least one of our general articles-
Article 13--and much of earlier court-martial procedure may
be traced to Continental European sources is difficult to
determine. However, whatever the historical or other reasons
may be, it is clear that in the general articles apart from
79 See United States v. Daggett, 11 US.C.M.A. 681, 29 C.M.R. 497 (1960),
which leaves the matter in doubt.
80 For an interesting, though non-technical, presentation of the Continental
European romanesque legal systems, see WIGssO, PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S
LEGAL SYSTEMS ch. XV (1936); BTuRiCK, THE BECH AND BAR OF OTHER
LANDS, chs. III-V (1939).
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the "crimes or offenses not capital" clause we are not dealing
with such things as dishonorable failure to pay debts, assault
and battery upon minor children, and other conveniently
identifiable delicts or crimes alone. We are dealing with
theoretical but nevertheless intensely practical concepts of
guilt, deeply flavored with important and even crucial con-
siderations of public policy which in cold fact are probably
well understood by even the most ignorant offender. These
theories of guilt, which in some instances may have a mens
rea somewhat different from that ordinarily found in com-
mon-law crimes but which are still much more meaning-
ful than those expressions of criminality contained in some
of our so-called "malum prohibitum" statutes that are be-
coming more and more prevalent in the civilian field, are
simply but lucidly expounded in the following terms-"dis-
orders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and
military discipline," "conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the armed forces," and "conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman." Should there be any lingering doubt as
to the precise nature of these terms, that doubt has been
dispelled with respect to matters prejudicial to good order
and military discipline and conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman by the terse provisions of the Manual,8'
si The Manual discussion of Article 134 (para. 213 (a)) states inter alia:
"'To the prejudice of good order and discipline' refers only to acts directly
prejudicial to good order and discipline and not to acts which are prejudicial only
in a remote or indirect sense. An irregular or improper act on the part of a
member of the military service can scarcely be conceived which may not be
regarded as in some indirect or remote sense prejudicing discipline, but the
article does not contemplate such distant effects and is confined to cases in
which the prejudice is reasonably direct and palpable."
The Manual discussion of Article 133 para. 212 states, inter alia: "Conduct
violative of this article is action or behavior in an official capacity which, in
dishonoring or disgracing the individual as an officer, seriously compromises his
character as a gentleman, or action or behavior in an unofficial or private
capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the individual personally, seriously
compromises his standing as an officer.
"There are certain moral attributes common to the ideal officer and the
perfect gentleman, a lack of which is indicated by acts of dishonesty or unfair
dealing, of indecency or indecorum, or of lawlessness, injustice, or cruelty.
Not everyone is or can be expected to meet ideal moral standards, but there is
a limit of tolerance below which the individual standards of an officer, cadet,
or midshipman cannot fall without seriously compromising his standing as an
officer, cadet, or midshipman or his character as a gentleman. This article
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following ancient precedent.82 The Court of Military Ap-
peals has quite effectively defined the limits of the "conduct
to the discredit of the armed forces" clause by indicating that
conduct reflecting only some measure of discredit on the
armed forces is not enough, 3 and that in this clause "Con-
gress intended to proscribe conduct which directly and ad-
versely affected the good name of the service," 84 thus parallel-
ing the limitations upon the "prejudice of good order and
military discipline" clause found in the Manual.
A few cases from the Court of Military Appeals will
serve to show that the general articles are not to be considered
as a fertile ground for crystallization by case law and that
their general clauses are to be considered as expressing, in
themselves, the governing law on the subject. Of course, as
mentioned earlier, the cases are a guide and an appeal to
reason. But one who relies on a particular case in this field
had better be very sure that he has an exact parallel and,
more importantly, even then he cannot assume that the
judicial winds will not have changed in the meantime.8 5
contemplates conduct by an officer, cadet, or midshipman which, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, is thus compromising."
In comparing the general clauses of Article 134 with Article 133, it
should be noted that officers are and must be held to a somewhat higher stand-
ard of conduct and responsibility than are enlisted persons. United States v.
Downard, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 538, 542 n.2, 20 C.M.R. 254, 258 n.2 (1955); see
United States v. Underwood, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 413, 27 C.M.R. 487 (1959).
82 WINTHROp 710-13, 723. With respect to conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman, Winthrop states, and so does the Manual by inference, that
in order to constitute this offense the conduct in question must be unbecoming
in regard to both concepts, officer and gentleman, not just one of them.8 3 United States v. Downard, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 538, 20 C.M.R. 254 (1955).
To be considered dishonorable, a failure to maintain a sufficient bank balance
to cover a check or a failure to pay a debt must be characterized by deceit,
evasion, false promise, bad faith, or gross indifference. See also United States
v. Groom, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 11, 30 C.M.R. 11 (1960).
84United States v. Sanchez, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 216, 218, 29 C.M.R. 32, 34
(1960).
85 United States v. Day, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 549, 29 C.M.R. 365 (1960). Here
the Court of Military Appeals reversed a conviction for usury (loaning money
at an "unconscionable" rate of interest), in violation of Article 134, on the
ground that there was no such offense in military law, despite the fact that
the present and earlier Manuals for Courts-Martial had listed usury as an
offense under the general article and convictions for usury had long been
sustained by military appellate tribunals. Judge Latimer wrote a strong
dissent, stating that usury was in fact prejudicial to military discipline. This
case, which is really atypical of the principles expressed in the text, will
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An illustration of the validity of the proposition that
the general provisions of the general articles are a law
unto themselves and are not governed by particular judicial
decisions is found in the case of United States v. Williams.s8
In that case, the accused had been convicted of wrongfully
using a habit forming narcotic drug in violation of Article
134. This offense is mentioned in the Manual under the
discussion of the "prejudice of good order and military
discipline" clause of Article 134. On appeal, the defense con-
tended that the conviction could not stand because the law
officer had failed to instruct the members of the court that
in order to find the accused guilty they must find as one of
the elements that the accused's conduct was prejudicial to
good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of
a nature to bring discredit on the armed forces. In holding
that the contention of the defense was correct, the court
said:
It [the matter omitted by the law officer] is an element of
the offense and must be instructed upon. The Government's con-
tention that wrongful use of narcotics is prejudicial conduct as a
matter of law would be equally applicable to practically every offense
charged under the general Article. Accordingly, we hold that the
law officer erred in failing to instruct the court that in order
to find the accused guilty of the offense charged, it must find
that under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or
was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.87
probably cause some readers to think that the author might have qualified his
statement to the effect that the standards of the general articles are capable of
being understood by all service personnel by indicating that those who have
had their convictions reversed on appeal might sometimes have difficulty in
this connection.
86 8 U.S.C.M.A. 325, 24 C.M.R. 135 (1957).
87 Id. at 327, 24 C.M.R. at 137. Judge Latimer dissented on the ground
that the Manual itself stated, with good reason, that wrongful possession of a
habit forming narcotic drug was an offense under Article 134 and that this
would be obvious to anyone. While the author personally agrees with the
dissent, the case is nevertheless a useful vehicle to illustrate the point made
in the text. Parenthetically, it might be of interest to know that the majority
opinion points out that although it is necessary to instruct upon these matters,
it is not necessary to allege in the pleadings that the conduct was prejudicial
to good order and military discipline or that it was service discrediting.
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It is very probable that the same instructional requirements
would apply with respect to conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman.18
Another case supporting the principles here suggested
is the case of United States v. Snyder."9 The accused had
been convicted of three specifications of wrongfully and un-
lawfully attempting to entice another service member to
engage in sexual intercourse with a female to be directed to
him by the accused, in violation of Article 134. The Judge
Advocate General of the Navy certified the case to the Court
of Military Appeals asking whether the three specifications
stated offenses under Article 134. In holding that they did,
the court made some interesting comments concerning Article
134 in general. The court stated:
It is true, as urged by appellate defense counsel, that forni-
cation, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, has been held
not to be an offense under military law. United States v. Ord,
2 CMR (AF) 84. This is consistent with the view expressed
earlier herein that Congress has not intended by Article 134 and
its statutory predecessors to regulate the wholly private moral con-
duct of an individual. It does not follow, however, that fornication
may not be committed under such conditions of publicity or scandal
as to enter that area of conduct given over to the police re-
sponsibility of the military establishment. Likewise it does not
at all follow that, because simple fornication is not an offense
cognizable under military law, neither is enticement or an attempt
at enticement thereto. 90
Thus we see that the facts and circumstances, not the
name by which a particular act may be called, will make or
break any prosecution under the general articles, depending
upon whether those facts or circumstances are judicially re-
garded as falling within the stated prohibitions or theories of
88 See U.S. DsE'T OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET No. 27-9, MILITARY JUSTICE-
THE LAw OFFImc, par. 74d (1958).89 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 4 C.M.P 15 (1952).
9 0 Id. at 427, 4 C.M.P. at 19. See also United States v. Berry, 6 U.S.C.M.A.
609, 20 C.M.R. 325 (1956); United States v. Sanchez, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 216,
29 C.M.R. 32 (1960)-act of bestiality with a chicken held criminal per se and
a violation of Article 134, but the question of pre-emption by Article 125
(sodomy) was purposely not raised by the defense.
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guilt of those articles. One limitation, however, upon this
approach is the doctrine of pre-emption which has been pre-
viously discussed. When that doctrine is applicable, the
concepts of the general articles fall by the wayside.
CONCLUSION
Those who have had any experience in the field of
military justice will realize at once, of course, that there
are many problems connected with the construction and ap-
plication of the general articles which have not been touched
upon in this discussion. The intent of the author was only
to bring to light some of the rather obscure historical back-
ground of the articles and to mention, in a relatively brief
form, what were thought to be their most important and
troublesome aspects. If we have done nothing more, how-
ever, this paper should at least have indicated that the
general articles are indeed living and growing members of
the corpus of military law, that it is important to understand
their ancestry which has given shape and meaning to their
present day existence, and that a flexible and even philo-
sophical approach must be employed in applying them to
the circumstances and happenings of military life.
From the standpoint of maintaining the discipline and
good name of the United States Armed Forces at home and
abroad, the general articles, and in particular Article 134,
are extremely valuable. Back in 1912 and 1913, when a
major revision of the military code which later became the
Articles of War of 1916 was under consideration, it was
mentioned that fully twenty-five per cent of all "cases" tried
in the Army were prosecuted under the predecessor to Article
134.91 It did not appear whether inferior court-martial cases
were included in these statistics, but the probabilities are that
91 See COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED NEW ARTIcLEs OF WAR WITH THE
PRESENT ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER RELATED STATUTES 50 (1912);
"Explanation" accompanying S. 1032, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1913). In
COMPARATIVE PRINT SHOWING S. 3191 WITH THE PRESENT ARTICLES OF WAR
AND OTHER RELATED STATUTES 58 (1916), the statement was made that
fifty per cent of the cases tried were Article 134 cases. This statement is
probably erroneous.
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they were not and that only general court-martial cases were
considered in arriving at this percentage. In those days
there were only forty-four specific articles, while today, under
the Uniform Code, there are fifty-four specifically denounced
crimes and offenses. Even so, taking a sampling from one
of the services, during the calendar year 1960, fourteen per
cent of all offenses tried by Army general courts-martial were
Article 134 offenses and twenty-three per cent of all persons
so tried were prosecuted under this article.9 2 Bringing our
discussion thus to a close, it can readily be seen that the
need for an effective means of solving unforeseen and often
unforeseeable problems of military misconduct through the
civilized processes of the law, which prompted Gustavus
Adolphus to include a general article in his early code, is as
much a requirement of a properly disciplined and controlled
armed force in our present society as it was in those of
former times.
92 Statistics obtained from Court-Martial Records Branch, Military Justice
Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
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